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FORMAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
DIGEST OF OPINIONS RENDERED DURING JANUARY, FEBRU-
ARY, MARCH, 1943, BY HON. NATHANIEL L. GOLDSTEIN,
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK*
* Grateful acknowledgment for leave to print the opinions herein is made
to Hon. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General of the State of New York.
They do not embrace all opinions rendered and received but only those which
are deemed of special interest to the readers of St. Johrs Law Review.
(1/6/43) EDUCATION LAW § 1066
Determination of residence of students as to payment of tuition:
To qualify for exemption from payment of tuition fee to State
University or College pursuant to Section 1066 of Education Law, a
student must be "a bona fide resident of New York State."
Domicile and residence are distinguishable. The former can be
only singular, while the latter may be multiple. Domicile is the place
where one has his home and to which he intends ultimately to return
after a temporary absence. Residence requires actual presence and
may exist independently of domicile.
Courts construe provisions dealing with educational privileges
dependent upon residence broadly, but do not favor residence of a
temporary nature solely to obtain such privilege.
Voting not necessarily a criterion of bona fide residence, as other
requirements may disqualify; lack of citizenship, insufficient length of
residence, etc. The privilege should be extended only to those whose
stay within the state is of such a character and duration as to consti-
tute them a part of the community. Each case will depend, of neces-
sity, on its own peculiar facts. Ownership of property standing by
itself, however, an insufficient criterion.
(1/18/43) BANKING LAw § 602
Merged banks succeed to all right of administration exercised by
the original bank:
In view of the language of § 602 of the Banking Law and ruling
of the court in O'Rourke v. Standard Wood Turning Co., 204 App.
Div. 658, the merged bank simply by the merger, and without any
further proceeding, may exercise all the rights and powers of admin-
istration of the original merged bank and may as fiduciary seek to
take possession of funds belonging to a decedent.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
(1/26/43) WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Mutual Self-Insurance Plan Adopted by County Under Section 50,
subdivision 3-a of W. C. L., Coverage and Applicability-Volunteer
Firemen
Section 50 of Workmen's Compensation Law provides methods
of coverage; the liability, however, of a municipality to its employees
is created by Section 3, subdivision 1-Group 17 of the Law, where
the hazards involved fall within the classifications embodied in groups
1-16.
There is no distinction made in so far as coverage is concerned
between elective and appointed municipal employees (last sentence of
Group 19 of Section 3, subdivision 1 of W. C. L.), provided however,
that those employees properly classified as executives may under
Section 54, subdivision 6 of the W. C. L., waive coverage.
Volunteer Firemen are covered by the law under Section 2, sub-
division 4 and subdivision 5 of the W. C. L., and an injured volunteer
firemen's compensation would properly be secured under subdivision
3-a of Section 50 of the W. C. L. even when his injury occurs outside
the limits of the participating municipality, providing he was per-
forming his duty under the direction or authority of said participating
municipality.
(2/1/43) PRESIDENT'S EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 8389; GENERAL
LICENSE No. 42
Comptroller is under no duty to determine status of applicant for
refund, unless some facts indicating that applicant might be a blocked
national are called to his attention.
Refunds of security deposits under Section 94-E of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law do not impose a duty upon the Department of Audit
and Control to ascertain affirmatively whether applicants for such
refunds are blocked nationals as defined in President's Executive
Order No. 8389. The above order was liberalized on February 23,
1942, by General License No. 42, issued by the Treasury Department
and which amended the same to the extent that licensing of persons,
corporations, associations, etc., as generally licensed nationals applies
to such individuals as resided in the United States on February 23,
1942.
The purpose of this order is to allow any and all individuals
residing within the United States to do business as though they were
citizens of the United States unless they are specifically prohibited by
other clauses in the general license. Reliance is made in arriving at
such construction upon a press release issued by the Treasury De-
partment which accompanied this order to the effect that persons
dealing with residents of the United States after February 23, 1942,
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may assume that such residents are not blocked unless they are
affirmatively on notice to the contrary.
It follows, of course, that if something is specifically brought to
the attention of the Department which would indicate that the par-
ticular individual to whom a refund is to be made may be a blocked
national, it would be its clear duty to thereupon determine the status
of the applicant.
(2/1/43) DoMEsTIc RELATIONS LAW § 7, subd. 5
Examinations by physicians of patient, pursuant to Domestic
Relations Law, may be either joint or individual.
The procedure for examination of an allegedly incurably insane
person for purposes of annulment is set forth in Section 7, subdivision
5 of the Domestic Relations Law. A reading of said section does not
lead to an interpretation that the required examination which is to be
done by three physicians who are recognized authorities on mental
disease, must be jointly made, although it has become more or less
customary for the examination of the patient to be a joint examina-
tion. If, in the judgment of any one of said three physicians a sepa-
rate examination will enable him to reach a conclusion as to the sanity
of the patient, he may make such independent examination.
(2/2/43) PENAL LAW §§ 1297 and 1941
An indeterminate sentence of not less than two and one-half or
more than ten years, imposed upon a person convicted of grand lar-
ceny in the second degree as a second offender, is improper. The
minimum of such sentence should be at least five years.
Section 1941 of the Penal Law which was amended by Chapter
700 of the Laws of 1942, and became effective May 8, 1942, changed
the minimum sentence to be imposed thereafter upon, second or third
felony offenders. This section is construed to provide that in a con-
viction of grand larceny in the second degree as a second offender, the
indeterminate sentence which is to be imposed falls within the proviso
of Section 1941 above, which provides that the minimum of the in-
determinate sentence to be imposed under said section for second or
third felony offenders, shall, in no case, be less than five years. This
crime does not fall within the exception that where the maximum
punishment for a second or third felony offender is five years or less
the minimum sentence must be not less than two years, in view of the
fact that a second or third felony offender who has been convicted of
grand larceny in the second degree, is punishable in the maximum by
a sentence of more than five years.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
(2/2/43) MILITARY LAW § 237
Toll Gates, Free Passage for Members of Military Forces of United
States in Time of War-Necessity of Actual Duty
The right of free passage through toll gates applies to all mem-
bers of military forces of the United States in time of war when in
uniform, although not performing any assigned military task:
Section 237 of the Military Law applies to military forces of the
United States only when the nation is at war because in war time
members of the armed forces do not revert to an inactive status when
they are not actually performing an assigned military duty. They
remain on active duty at all times, even though periodically granted
temporary leaves. Hence, Section 237 of the Military Law entitles
members of the armed forces of the United States to free passage over
all toll bridges within the state of New York, providing they are in
uniform and regardless of whether they are performing a specific
military duty, during the continuance of a state of war.
An informal opinion of the Attorney-General to the New York
State Bridge Authority, dated September 12, 1933 (48 St. Dep't
Reports 428) written in connection herewith, held that the statute
applied only when persons in military service were on active duty at
the time of passage through the toll gate. This opinion, together
with other prior opinions, interprets said Section 237 primarily with
reference to members of state military forces who, when not on ordered
military duty, have a purely inactive military status and therefore do
not come within the provisions of said section for free passage.
(2/3/43) TAx LAW § 4, subd. 6
Exemption from Taxation of Real Property of Corporations Organ-
ized Exclusively for Religious, Educational and Cemetery Purposes:
Special District Taxes
The real property of corporations organized exclusively for re-
ligious, educational and cemetery purposes and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes, while exempt
from taxes levied for the ordinary support of government, is not
exempt from special district taxes levied to cover the expense of im-
provements that are specifically beneficial to the property.
There is a distinction to be observed between taxes levied for the
ordinary support of government and those taxes or assessments which
are levied in special districts to cover the expenses of improvements
which are specifically beneficial to the property. Under the former
the real property of corporations organized exclusively for religious,
educational and cemetery purposes and used exclusively for carrying
out thereupon one or more of such purposes, is exempt from the pay-
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ment of such a tax pursuant to Section 4, subdivision 6 (formerly
subdivision 7) of the Tax Law. On the other hand, as a result of
People ex rel. New York School for the Deaf v. Townsend, 173 Misc.
906, aff'd, 261 App. Div. 841, the law now existing appears to be
that those taxes or assessments which are levied and charged upon
properties in proportion to the benefits received from local improve-
ments must pay such assessments or taxes even though the properties
in question may include those included within the classifications made
by the aforementioned subdivision 7. This ruling applies whether
the levies are what are commonly called special assessments or levies
made upon properties in special districts for local improvements,
which levies are made like ordinary taxes, in accordance with the
assessed valuations of the properties.
The effect of the decision in the Townsend case, supra, and The
Nuns of the Order of St. Dominic v. Town of Huntington, 268 N. Y.
580, is to overrule the 1915 opinion of the Attorney-General which
was to the contrary (Op. Atty.-Gen. 1915, Vol. 2, p. 44).
(2/23/43) TAx LAW § 219-c
Lien of Corporation Franchise Tax, Prior Mortgage, Merger with
Fee
The question whether a merger of the mortgage and fee interests
takes place upon the conveyance to the mortgagee of the fee, thus
extinguishing the mortgage lien and establishing the corporation fran-
chise tax as a primary lien upon the real property, depends upon the
intention of the parties to the conveyance. The interest of the owner
of the fee in keeping the mortgage alive must be considered upon the
question of the intention of the parties:
Question as to whether, upon a foreclosure by a bank of a mort-
gage, a merger of the mortgage and fee interests took place at the
time of the conveyance to the bank, in lieu of foreclosure, resulting in
the wiping out of the mortgage lien and the establishment of the
franchise taxes as primary liens upon the real property, pursuant to
Section 219-c, subdivision 2 of the Tax Law, depends solely upon the
intention of the parties to the conveyance.
It has long been a 'general rule that a lien may be kept alive
against junior incumbrances if equity so determines or the parties so
intend; courts do not favor merger and will presume against it wher-
ever it will operate to the disadvantage of the parties (Hennessy v.
King, 225 App. Div. 152,. aff'd, 252 N. Y. 570).
The task of arriving at a correct conclusion- in any particular
case requires, as a condition precedent, information beyond the mere
fact of acquisition by the mortgagee of the fee of the mortgaged prem-
ises, but the Tax Department, before granting any release under Sec-
tion 219-c of the Tax Law, should require the bank (mortgagee) to
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
furnish satisfactory proof that the parties to the conveyance to the
bank did not intend that the lien of the mortgage should be extin-
guished thereby.
(3/9/43) REAL PROPERTY LAW §§ 290, 300; GENERAL CONSTRUC-
TION LAW § 11
Acknowledgments by Persons in Military or Naval Service
Section 300 of the Real Property Law authorizing acknowledg-
ments by persons in military or naval service to be taken before certain
officers of the army or navy has application to a wide variety of in-
struments:
The certificate of acknowledgment so taken by an officer in mili-
tary or naval service must contain the statement that the party or
parties making such acknowledgment was, at the time of making the
same, enlisted or commissioned in the military or naval forces of the
United States and engaged in military or naval duties.
There must be attached to such a certificate of acknowledgment a
certificate of the Secretary of War or Navy, or of an officer of the
War or Navy Department having charge of the record of the com-
missions of officers in the Department that the officer taking the
acknowledgment was duly commissioned and acting as such at the
time that he took the same.
(3/16/43) LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT TO FURNISH HEAT
-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF COVENANT
Where lease contains specific covenant to furnish heat, state may
recover from landlord for actual damages because of failure to furnish
adequate heat, which damages may include the salaries of employees
rendered idle by such failure, also salaries of employees required to
work overtime, and all salaries of extra employees necessarily required
because of such failure:
Upon facts given in inquiry, which establish that a landlord's
failure to furnish heat, required by a covenant in a lease, was not
occasioned by inability to obtain fuel, and further that such failure on
the part of the landlord was substantial and not a temporary situation
involving a few degrees of temperature, tenant would have a cause of
action for the actual damages suffered by reason of the landlord's
failure to furnish such heat.
Where the state was the tenant, and as the result of the land-
lord's breach of the covenant in the lease to furnish heat, the state was
obliged to dismiss its employees and thereafter, on other days, hire
extra employees, the state had two alternative remedies: (1) It could
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treat the failure to furnish heat as a constructive eviction and move
out (provided it moves while the failure to furnish heat continues)
and thereafter recover damages, or (2) it could remain on the prem-
ises and either abate the rent or bring an independent action on the
covenant. (Bliss v. Clark, 104 Misc. 543; Jackson v. Paterno, 128
App. Div. 474.)
In relation to the measure of damages, the state also has two
alternatives: (1) The state could recover the difference between the
rental value of the premises heated, and the value of the premises
unheated, or (2) the state could recover the actual damages suffered,
as may be fairly supposed to have been within the contemplation of
the parties when they made the contract. (Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.
489.) Such damages may include the salaries of the employees ren-
dered idle by the cold, and the salaries of extra workers necessarily
employed because of such breach on the part of the landlord, and any
other actual damage resulting therefrom. (Volga Realty Corp. v.
Holt Co., Inc., 104 Misc. 581.)
